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to force cleanup of a toxic waste dump in southern New Hamp-
shire. The site was mostly cleaned up. All but one of the private
parties had settled. The remaining private party litigated the cost
of cleaning up the last little bit, a cost of about $9.3 million to
remove a small amount of highly diluted PCBs and "volatile or-
ganic compounds" (benzene and gasoline components) by incin-
erating the dirt. How much extra safety did this $9.3 million buy?
The forty-thousand-page record of this ten-year effort indicated
(and all the parties seemed to agree) that, without the extra ex-
penditure, the waste dump was clean enough for children playing
on the site to eat small amounts of dirt daily for 70 days each year
without significant harm. Burning the soil would have made it
clean enough for the children to eat small amounts daily for 245
days per year without significant harm. But there were no dirt-
eating children playing in the area, for it was a swamp. Nor were
dirt-eating children likely to appear there, for future building
seemed unlikely. The parties also agreed that at least half of the
volatile organic chemicals would likely evaporate by the year
2000.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of bills designed to increase the role of risk assess-
ment and benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decision making were
introduced by the 104th Congress. Many of the proposals would
have greatly altered regulatory agencies' current practices. Some
risk reform proposals would have required federal regulatory agen-
cies to use central tendency estimates-instead of the conservative
assumptions they often use today-to estimate levels of exposure in
risk analyses, and to clearly articulate the assumptions embedded
in risk assessments and benefit-cost analysis, so they can be ana-
lyzed and debated by the regulatory community.2 With respect to
benefit-cost analysis, some bills included a supermandate provision
which would have required benefit-cost analysis in all circum-
stances. The supermandate provision would have trumped both
existing statutes which prohibit balancing of benefits and costs,3 as
well as the executive order which exempts agencies from using a
benefit-cost test when such a test conflicts with the agency's legisla-
tive mandate.4 Another, more limited, proposal would have re-
quired Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) analysts to
1. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-12 (1993).
2. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 105(2) (1995).
3. Risk Assessment: House Considering Broad Mandate to Apply Cost-Benefit Provision to All
Laws, 18 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1478 (Jan. 13, 1995).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.FR. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
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undertake an explicit benefit-cost analysis for those Superfund site
cleanups which cost more than $5 million.5
The congressional battle over these and other regulatory re-
forms ignited a debate about how such procedural reforms would
affect regulatory policy. Proponents of the reform bills argued that
the reforms would enhance efficiency. Many of the proposed re-
forms reflect economists' views that regulation would be more effi-
cient if federal agencies based regulatory decisions on analyses that
consider a range of assumptions, explained the risks their regula-
tions address in terms of risks assumed to exist in other areas of
our lives, and explicitly balanced the benefits and costs of the rules
they proposed.6 Scholars such as Cass Sunstein make the case that
benefit-cost analysis can systematically produce information on the
impacts of regulatory decisions, focus attention on such decisions'
intended and unintended effects, and assist agencies in taking into
account both the quantifiable and unquantifiable effects of regula-
tory decisions.7
In contrast, many opponents of regulatory reform saw the pro-
posed changes as a thinly veiled attempt to reduce rather than im-
prove regulation, noting that regulatory reform coincided with the
first election of a Republican House in forty years. Reform oppo-
nents have offered a number of critiques of the reform bills: bene-
fit-cost analysis would weaken regulatory protection if the costs of
regulation are more easily quantified than the benefits;' the lack
of knowledge in areas such as epidemiology and toxicology may
cause risks to human health to be underestimated;' and the diver-
gence of public perceptions and expert analyses may result in the
assessments of risk experts overriding the "preferences" of those
affected by a regulation."0
Reform opponents also argued that the bills presented many
procedural problems. Some bills explicitly provided for judicial
challenges to the economic analyses, which would lead to in-
creased litigation and unnecessary involvement of the courts in
5. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995).
6. Id. §§ 105(3), 201(a)(4) (1995).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1996).
8. GOP Contract WTould Undermine Enforcement of Environmental Regulations, Groups Say,
25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1691 (Jan. 6, 1995).
9. See generally Regulatory Reform Bill Poses Threat to Environmental Justice, Activists Say, 25
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2119 (Mar. 3, 1995).
10. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 265 tbl. 3.
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regulatory decision making."' The establishment of peer review
panels to evaluate the scientific bases of regulatory proposals would
add additional delays. The increase in reporting requirements for
regulators spurred by the detailed retrospective regulatory assess-
ments and other reports to Congress required by some bills, cou-
pled with proposed cuts in agency budgets, would lead to
regulatory gridlock. 12
The conflicting views of the regulatory reforms, as either effi-
ciency-enhancing or strategically burdensome, reflect a broader
controversy over the general role of the administrative procedures
that govern regulatory action. Traditional legal theories hold that
legislation such as the Administrative Procedures Act establishes a
framework to ensure openness, fairness, and public participation
in rulemaking. Under this view, the rulemaking process itself is a
normative good, since people value the democratic method of de-
cision making embodied in the open and participatory process,
and the information exchange generated by mechanisms such as
notice and comment rulemaking generally improves the rulemak-
ing outcomes.13
More recent literature describes administrative procedures as
an instrument of political control. This theory, associated most
strongly with the trio Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry
Weingast,14 details how members of Congress attempt to use ad-
ministrative procedures, such as the design of the regulatory deci-
sion-making environment, to achieve political ends. Legislated
administrative procedures help reelection-oriented Congress mem-
11. Unintended Consequences for Business Predicted if Existing Legislation Enacted, 19
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 201 (May 19, 1995); House Bill's Risk Provisions Called "Prescription
for Gridlock" by Chafee, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2037 (Feb. 24, 1995).
12. See Id.
13. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. Ray. 1
(1982); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of PoWer in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1975); John S. Wiley, Jr., A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HAmv. L. RE%,. 713 (1986).
14. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Pohtical
Contro4 3J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Proce-
dures]; Mathew McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. RE%,. 499 (1989); McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. Lj. 705 (1992). See
also MurrayJ. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies:" Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative
Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REv. 499 (1989);Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design
and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
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bers serve the interests of their constituents, including voters and
campaign donors. Examples of the strategic use of administrative
procedures to reward interest groups include laws requiring a par-
ticular burden of proof,'5 mandating that agencies consider the
environmental impacts of their actions,'6 and providing avenues
for public participation in federal agency decision making.17
In this article we explore the issues raised in the debate over
regulatory reform by examining the potential effects of implement-
ing a mix of the proposed reforms within a highly visible and con-
troversial environmental program, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's remediation of hazardous waste sites under
the Superfund program. In Part II we describe EPA's current risk
assessment procedures and other practices relating to Superfund
implementation. In Part III we offer a qualitative description of
how various proposed benefit-cost and risk assessment changes
would have affected EPA's analyses and decisions under the
Superfund program. In Part IV we provide quantitative data re-
vealing the effects that different proposed policy reforms would
have had on the Superfund program, had they been implemented.
For a nationwide sample of 150 sites for which EPA made cleanup
decisions in 1991-92, we examine how the sites selected for
remediation would have been evaluated and how remediation deci-
sions would have differed if various benefit-cost and risk assessment
reforms had been in place. This examination demonstrates the po-
tential gains in efficiency which could be achieved within the
Superfund program through regulatory reform and indicates the
degree to which implementation of such reform is feasible. In Part
V, we conclude that the application of benefit-cost principles in the
Superfund program could provide greater protection of human
health and the environment through a program focused on the
15. For example, under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act a company must
prove that a drug is safe before bringing it to market, while under the Toxic Substances
Control Act, EPA must prove that a chemical is harmful to prevent its marketing. See Mc-
Cubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 14.
16. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act requires that regulators at
least develop information on the environmental impacts of their decisions. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1994).
17. For example, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EP-
CRA) allows interested parties to petition EPA to remove chemicals from the list which
governs industry pollutant discharge and release reporting under the Toxics Release In-
ventory program. In one instance, EPA removed the reporting requirement under EPCRA
for the chemical di-n-octyl phthalate (DnOP) after the Vista Chemical Company petitioned
for its removal. See Facilities No Longer Required to Report DnOP on EPCRA 's Toxic Release Inven-
tori, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1238 (Oct. 8, 1993).
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balancing of real risks against cleanup costs. The calculations we
present in Part V document the extent to which EPA can reduce
cleanup expenditures without jeopardizing the objective of reduc-
ing risks.
II. How EPA IMPLEMENTs SUPERFUND TODAY
A. Assessment of Health Risks
EPA currently bases its hazardous waste site remediation deci-
sions-such as which sites to clean up first, and how clean to make
those sites-in part on its evaluation of the health risks associated
with each particular waste site. Since estimates of risk levels can
trigger certain actions in the Superfund program, it is useful to
analyze first the general nature of risk assessment and its particular
implementation in the Superfund program. The National Re-
search Council (NRC) defines risk assessment as a four-step pro-
cess involving (1) hazard identification (examining whether
exposure to a substance generates adverse health outcomes), (2)
dose-response assessment (exploring the relationship between the
dose of a substance and the probability of the adverse health out-
come), (3) exposure assessment (identifying the intensity, fre-
quency, and duration of an individual's exposure to the
substance), and (4) risk characterization (estimating the magni-
tude and/or probability that an adverse health reaction will occur
from exposure to a substance)." NRC's definition distinguishes
risk assessment-the quantitative calculation of the probability of
cancer or likelihood of noncancer health effects such as kidney dis-
ease or birth defects, from risk management-decisions about what
levels of risk are acceptable and how risks might be remediated."9
Each step of the risk assessment and management procedures
has been the topic of significant debate. For hazard identification,
questions arise about using animal data or fragmentary evidence
from small epidemiology studies as a basis for identifying which
substances may be hazardous to humans.2 ° Within dose-response
models, analysts face the problem of extrapolating the probability
of an adverse reaction at low doses of exposure from data on high
18. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, NAT'L AcAD. OF Sci., RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 20-33 (1983).
19. See id. at 18-19.
20. See Robert B. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk As-
sessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. Rev. 103, 113; Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic
Risk Assessment, 5 YLEJ. ON REG. 89, 98-100 (1988); Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaning-
ful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARv. EN-r. L. RE%,. 409, 432-36 (1995).
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doses of exposure, and deciding whether a threshold exists below
which no harm is expected." Most models of cancer incidence
assume there is no "safe" dose of a carcinogen, or no exposure
level below which no harm is expected. On the other hand, many
models of noncancer health effects do offer concentration levels
where there is no observable adverse effect (NOAEL), and concen-
tration levels indicating the lowest observed adverse effect level
(LOAEL).22 With exposure assessment, variability across individu-
als and different demographic groups may not be reflected in as-
sessment assumptions, and there often is substantial uncertainty
about the distribution for many parameters. 3 The final stage of
risk characterization generates critiques based on the degree to
which underlying assumptions are not explicitly stated, the likeli-
hood that assumed scenarios will occur, and the extent to which
estimates are reported as a range of probabilities rather than a sin-
gle estimate of risk.24
EPA conducts an individual risk assessment for each site on the
National Priorities List (NPL), the set of sites that qualify for
remediation funds. EPA analysts assess chemical concentrations at
the site and then estimate the corresponding health risks associ-
ated with the site.25 The health risk estimate is comprised of both
21. See Kuehn, supra note 20, at 116; see also Latin, supra note 20, at 98-100; Shere,
supra note 20, at 436-38.
22. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9285.701A, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE IOR SUPERFUND, VOLUME 1:
HUvMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL PART A (INTERIM FINAL) 7-7, 8-11 (1989) [hereinafter
HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL].
23. See Kuehn, supra note 20, at 114; see also Shere, supra note 20, at 438-39.
24. See Kuehn, supra note 20, at 114; see also Shere, supra note 20, at 467-68.
25. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9355.0-30, ROLE OF THE BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT IN SUPERFUND
REMEDY SELECTION DECISIONS 1 (1991) [hereinafter OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMER-
GENCY RESPONSE DIRECTIVE].
The most precisely quantified risks are the excess cancer risks for carcinogens, which
are expressed in terms of a lifetime incremental cancer probability. The noncancer risk
from a given chemical is expressed as a hazard quotient, defined as the calculated expo-
sure intake divided by the chemical's reference dose (e.g., its highest no-observed-adverse-
effect level). Within a particular exposure pathway, the noncancer hazard quotients for
different chemicals are added to yield an overall pathway hazard index. While the hazard
index "sums" information on noncancer exposures, the fact that the severity of health
consequences (e.g., skin rashes or birth defects) differs for each chemical makes aggrega-
tion of non-cancer risks difficult. Moreover, the existence of a nonzero risk does not indi-
cate the magnitude of the risk, so the degree of hazard in terms of the probability of risk is
not clear for non-cancer exposures. For a further description of the Superfund risk assess-
ment process, see James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for
Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 583-84 (1994).
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calculations of individual lifetime excess cancer risks (LECRs) as
well as health risks due to exposure to chemicals associated with
other adverse health effects.
It is important to note that EPA's assessments of risk in the
Superfund program are based upon the calculated risk levels to a
potentially exposed individual. The agency does not consider the
number of potentially exposed individuals in its calculations of can-
cer risks. In addition, while EPA does not explicitly state the de-
gree of conservatism represented by its risk estimates, an
examination of the agency's assumptions reveals that it often uses
very conservative parameter values in its risk assessments. 26 For ex-
ample, in an analysis of health risks associated with groundwater
contaminants at Superfund sites where future residential develop-
ment is feasible, EPA analysts will simply assume such development.
will take place, without considering the likelihood of such develop-
ment. Such use of conservative assumptions prompted Justice
Breyer's concerns with the wisdom of the Superfund approach,
quoted above.
B. Determination of Cleanup Standards
During the early implementation of the Superfund program,
some critics noted that EPA officials used the latitude provided by
the legislation to reach cleanup agreements that were highly
favorable to polluters. 27 In response to the agency's implementa-
tion of the program, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) .28 This bill directs EPA to pursue
26. The degree of conservatism adopted in risk assessment in Superfund reflects
agency choices, since legislation does not require EPA to focus on "reasonable maximum
exposures," or on risks to a hypothetical or actual exposed individual rather than risks to
the entire population. In fact, the risk management goals established by Congress for the
Superfund program are extremely vague. The legislation calls for actions "as may be nec-
essary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or the
environment." Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 § 104(a) (1980) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
27. Joseph A. Davis, House Subcommittees Begin Reviewing EPA Documents; Two More Offi-
cials Are Fired, 41 CoNe. Q. WK.Y. 411, 412 (1983). See also James T. Hamilton, Goingby the
(Informal) Book: The EPA's Use of Informal Rules in Enforcing Hazardous Waste Laws, 7 An
VANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH 109 (1996); James
T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and The Choice of Rulemaking
Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1994) (providing evidence on how EPA has used discretion in enun-
ciating and enforcing hazardous waste laws).
28. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 § 9621(b) (1) (1986) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 and Supp. IV
1992)) [hereinafter SARA).
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remedies that "permanently and significantly [reduce] the volume,
toxicity, or mobility of hazardous substances,"29 thus discouraging
the selection of less costly remedies such as institutional controls,
containment, or removal. SARA also requires EPA to adopt as
Superfund site cleanup standards those federal environmental
standards from other programs that are "applicable" or "relevant
and appropriate" (ARARs), and any state environmental standards
that are more stringent than the federal standards.3"
The latitude of EPA site managers in making cleanup decisions
is further restricted by a 1991 EPA guidance memo which states
that if the cumulative lifetime excess cancer risk for an individual is
less than 10 - and the hazard quotient is less than one (meaning
the chemical exposure level for noncancer risks is below the "no
risk" threshold), then cleanup is "generally not warranted unless
there are adverse environmental impacts."3 ' While the directive
provides that EPA regional officials may choose to clean up sites
where cancer risks are between 10- and 10 - , it requires site man-
agers to explain why action is necessary if they choose to clean
up. 2 Site managers' cleanup decisions are guided also by EPA's
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan,33 which offers criteria for the site managers to use in selecting
cleanup remedies. Site managers may consider long-term effective-
ness and permanence, reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume,
short-term effectiveness, implementability, cost, state acceptance,
and community acceptance in developing a remediation plan, as
long as the plan protects human health and the environment and
complies with applicable environmental standards from other envi-
ronmental programs. 3 4
III. How THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM WOULD CHANGE UNDER THE
PROPOSED REFORMS
If the benefit-cost analysis and risk assessment reforms debated
in Congress were implemented within EPA's Superfund program,
the nature of EPA's analyses and resulting decisions would change
29. See id
30. See idU § 9621(d) (2) (A).
31. See OFFicE OF SOID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE DiRECrE, supra note 25, at
1.
32. See id. at 4.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1995).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9) (1995).
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substantially. 5 To illustrate how EPA's assessment of risks could
change under the proposed reforms, we consider EPA's calculation
of lifetime excess cancer risks for an adult Superfund site resident
exposed to groundwater contaminated with the chemical trichloro-
ethylene (TCE).36 The current EPA risk assessment guidelines,
outlined in the Human Health Evaluation Manual, encourage risk
analysts to estimate the "reasonable maximum exposure" at a site.37
In assessing the chemical concentration of TCE at the site, the ana-
lyst would use the 95th percentile of the mean concentration, or
the maximum concentration detected, whichever is lower. The an-
alyst would then make assumptions, in accordance with the "rea-
sonable maximum exposure" guidelines, regarding parameters
such as frequency of exposure (typically 350 - 365 days per year, an
upper bound assumption), daily ingestion of groundwater (2.0 li-
ters per day for adults, approximately the 90th percentile), and
number of years exposed to the contamination (thirty years, ap-
proximately the 95th percentile).38
Conservative assumptions are also embedded in EPA's assess-
ment of how likely it is that a chemical will cause cancer. To assess
this propensity EPA analysts use a figure called the chemical's
"slope factor," which is an upper bound estimate of the probability
of development of cancer per unit intake of the chemical over a
lifetime. This number, obtained from an EPA database represent-
ing the agency's assessment of the research literature on chemical
toxicity, may include built-in safety factors of 10 or 100 due to low
dose extrapolation or the assumption that animal data correlates
closely with human reactions.3 9 EPA analysts combine all of these
35. In our analysis, we combine a mix of individual proposals from the array of pro-
posed bills in order to examine the potential impacts of regulatory reform.
36. In an analysis of risk assessments at a sample of 78 Superfund sites, we found that
TCE was the third most frequently occurring carcinogen at these sites. TCE accounted for
5% of the total chemical cancer pathways at these sites. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 25,
at 637. For an example of Superfund site remediation involving TCE groundwater con-
tamination, see Parties Agree to Pay over $1 Million to Contain TCE Plume in Municipal Wells, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2267 (Feb. 17, 1989).
37. See HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 6-4. The degree of
conservatism this exposure level embodies is not specified. Default assumptions for risk
assessment parameters reflect different degrees of conservatism depending on the
parameter.
38. Mean values for these parameter values include 1.4 liters for daily ingestion of
water and nine years for exposure duration. For a discussion of the impact of conservatism
on the magnitude of Superfund risk assessment, see W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Conse-
quences of Conservatism in Superfund Risk Assessment (1996) (working paper, on file
with the Stanford Environmental Law Journal).
39. See Human Health Evaluation Manual supra note 22, at 7-11 to 7-13.
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assumptions to yield an estimate of the probability the on-site resi-
dent will contract cancer from drinking, groundwater contami-
nated with TCE.
In contrast, in a risk assessment conducted under the proposed
reforms, EPA would use a range of estimates regarding any one
parameter and would produce as a result a range of estimates of
cancer risk from TCE. One proposed bill, acknowledging that pa-
ramreters comprising cancer risk estimates are better conveyed as
distributions, would require agencies to present risk estimates
based on central tendency. For example, EPA analysts would be
required to calculate risk estimates using mean or median parame-
ter values, even if analysts also choose to use more conservative as-
sumptions in calculations.4"
Since EPA's current guidelines encourage analysts to use differ-
ing degrees of conservatism on different parameters, the degree of
conservatism represented in the ultimate risk assessment is un-
clear. Under the reform proposals, one could actually quantify the
degree of conservatism embedded in a risk estimate. This could be
done by applying Monte Carlo analysis to the approach described
above. In a Monte Carlo analysis, an analyst randomly picks a point
on the distribution of each parameter, estimates the lifetime excess
cancer risk based on these points, and then repeats the process
over and over to develop an estimate of the distribution of the life-
time excess cancer risk from TCE.4 ' Such an approach would en-
able analysts to identify the degree of conservatism embodied in
different points on the overall risk distribution in Superfund site
analyses.
Under other proposed risk assessment reforms, EPA's exposure
characterization would change dramatically. For example, where
future residential development on a Superfund site is feasible, the
reforms could require EPA analysts to incorporate the likelihood
of different exposure scenarios in their estimates of individual risk
levels, rather than automatically assuming that such development
will take place.42 These estimates of individual risk could then be
combined with U.S. census data on surrounding populations living
40. H.RL 1022, 104th Cong. § 110 (1995).
41. SeeJames T. Hamilton & Kip Viscusi, Agency Discretion, Coalition Drift, and So-
cial Welfare: Did the EPA Successfully Implement Superfund Legislation? (1996) (working
paper, on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Journal).
42. Cancer and noncancer risks at Superfund sites arise from several sources: dermal
exposure, ingestion, or inhalation of contaminated soil and water as people use a site as
residents, workers, recreational users, and trespassers.
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on and near a contaminated site, yielding a distribution of esti-
mates for the number of cancer cases arising from site contamina-
tion and the number of individuals likely to be exposed to
"nonsafe" levels of noncancer risks.4" These calculations of popula-
tion risks would provide more information than the EPA's current
practice of estimating risks to a potentially exposed individual.
Risk management in Superfund-the process of determining
what remedy will be selected at a site-would also radically change
under the proposed reforms. For example, one proposal would
require EPA to choose site remedies based on benefit-cost analysis
of site cleanups.' EPA would explicitly consider and balance
remediation costs with cancer and noncancer risks, calculating in-
dicators such as the cost per cancer case averted in their analysis.45
The benefit-cost analysis would indicate the additional cost of
meeting more stringent cleanup targets and establish the tradeoffs
embodied in the selection of permanent remedies such as treat-
ment of contamination instead of the use of institutional controls
(such as deed restrictions that prohibit future residential use), con-
tainment, or removal of wastes. Cleanup standards would change
even more dramatically if the supermandate provision, described
in Part I, were implemented, allowing this benefit-cost framework
to supersede the requirement that EPA use ARARs as cleanup
43. Estimating the expected number of cancer cases would involve assumptions
about contaminant plume size, groundwater use, and the dispersion of contaminants as
one gets farther from the site.
44. The use of benefit-cost analysis would automatically alter EPA's focus from indi-
vidual risks to population risks; the agency would implicitly be concerned about both the
magnitude of individual risks as well as the number of individuals exposed.
45. The evaluations of reductions in noncancer risks, since these range from skin
rashes to reproductive effects, will be particularly difficult. In addition, these risks are
stated as ratios of exposure rather than probabilities of experiencing the adverse effect. See
Human Health Evaluation Manual, supra note 22, at 8-15.
An ideal benefit-cost analysis of a proposed Superfund remediation would go beyond
mere calculation of the cost per cancer case averted. It would also quantify natural re-
source damages and, to the extent possible (perhaps through contingent valuation), mon-
etization of them. The analysis would explore synergistic effects of exposure to multiple
chemicals, though there currently are few data on the toxicity of combinations of chemi-
cals arising at Superfund sites, and would explore differences in the efficacy of cleanup
alternatives. For example, what is the probability that institutional controls will not suc-
ceed in restricting access to a site? What is the chance that a landfill containment will leak
over 30 years, or the likelihood that a removal action will result in contamination as the
waste is being transported offsite? Differences in the contribution of the site to a commu-
nity's economic output, such as the loss that would occur if institutional controls caused
land to lie fallow or the gain realized from future site use if the land were made suitable for
residential development, would also be part of the analysis.
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While many analysts have speculated about the impacts of regu-
latory reform on environmental policy, to date no one has esti-
mated quantitatively how these proposals would affect the
implementation of the Superfund program. In the following sec-
tion we use extensive risk and cost data from a sample of
Superfund sites to explore how regulatory decision making would
change under various benefit-cost and risk assessment reforms.
IV. EMniIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF REFORMS ON THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM
A. Structure of Analysis47
In this section we examine three different scenarios represent-
ing variations on EPA regulatory policy regarding which Superfund
sites qualify for remediation; two of the scenarios reflect implemen-
tation of the proposed regulatory reform measures. The first sce-
nario-the "current policy" scenario-is the structure under
existing risk assessment guidelines, and provides the baseline for
discussion. The second scenario-the "no ARARs" scenario-as-
sumes risk managers make decisions regarding which sites to reme-
diate based on risk considerations alone, rather than on the basis
of existing ARARs. Environmental standards from other state and
federal programs are thus no longer binding constraints. In this
scenario, we assume EPA remediates sites with cumulative individ-
ual risk of at least 10-, which represents a risk cut-off based on
current EPA guidelines.48 The third scenario-the "no future on-
site residents" scenario-assumes everything in the "no ARARs"
46. Both Senate Bill 343 and House Bill 9 at one time contained or considered bene-
fit-cost provisions that would supersede any existing laws. See House Considering Broad Man-
date to Apply Cost-Benefit Provision to All Laws, 18 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1478 (Jan. 13,
1995); see also Compromise to Address "Supermandate" Adopted by Senate in Regulatory Bil4 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) 566 (July 14, 1995).
47. Our analysis focuses on remediation actions at Superfund sites on the National
Priorities List (NPL), the set of sites that qualify for federal remediation funds. Any
hazardous waste site representing an immediate threat may qualify for short-term removal
actions. EPA has conducted over 3,000 removal actions at NPL and non-NPL sites since
1980, with an average cost of approximately $500,000. These removal actions are aimed at
addressing imminent health dangers. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/540/8-90/017, PROGRESS TOWARD
IMPLEMENTING SUPERFUND, Fjsc-.% YEAR 1989: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1990).
48. The 10' risk figure would not be pertinent if benefit-cost analysis were our sole
guide. It may, for example, be worthwhile to eliminate risks smaller than 10 ' if the ex-
posed population is large and the costs of risk reduction are low. In our analysis we use a
risk cutoff to demonstrate how remediations might change if attention were focused on a
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scenario and imposes the additional assumption that risk assess-
ment reforms require EPA analysts to perform risk assessments that
assume no new residents will move onto the Superfund site. This
scenario thus precludes EPA from including hypothetical, future
on-site resident risks in their risk assessments.49
We then cross the three scenarios with an additional element of
regulatory reform: the requirement that EPA analysts undertake
an explicit benefit-cost analysis for site cleanups exceeding $5 mil-
lion, and not remediate sites for which the costs of remediation
exceed the benefits." The $5 million threshold itself is an implicit
benefit-cost decision, for it suggests that the transaction costs asso-
ciated with benefit-cost analysis are more likely to yield higher net
benefits at sites with large resource expenditures than at those with
lower costs of remediation. We examine this assumption and the
relative benefit-cost performance of sites above and below the $5
million cost cutoff.
In analyzing this matrix of risk reform scenarios crossed with
benefit-cost reform, we consider several dimensions. First, we ex-
amine what percentage of sites have remediation costs exceeding
$5 million. Second, we consider the cleanup costs and health risks
associated with each Superfund site, and determine which sites
would pass a benefit-cost test (meaning which site cleanups would
have costs per cancer case averted lower than specific levels). Re-
lated questions under this second dimension are: is there a differ-
ence, above or below the $5 million cleanup cost threshold, in
terms of the desirability of the remediation decisions? Are the
cleanups which cost less than $5 million (and thus would not be
subject to benefit-cost analysis) more or less cost-effective? In other
words, are the cleanups which cost less than $5 million cleaning up
at a lower or higher cost per cancer avoided than those cleanups
given level of risk. We then add in benefit-cost considerations explicitly by calculating the
cost per cancer case averted at sites.
49. Zoning restrictions could, for example, prevent development of hazardous waste
sites for residential use. An alternative approach would be to estimate the probability of
future, on-site residents at sites that currently do not have on-site residents.
50. While EPA may have considered options with different costs in determining
cleanup remedies, the cost of cleanup at each site in our analysis is based on the actual
remedy EPA selected for the site. Costs are expressed in 1993 dollars.
Although the decisions regarding which sites to remediate are based on risk levels
rather than ARARs in our "no ARARs" and "no future on-site residents" scenarios, ARARs
may still have an impact on the costs of remediations examined at these sites. This result is
reached because current remediation expenditures may be influenced by the requirement
to meet state or federal AlRs.
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which cost more than $5 million? Third, we examine how these
policy analysis concerns interact with issues pertaining to environ-
mental equity. For example, will hazardous waste sites with higher
minority populations be disproportionately affected by a policy
based on benefit-cost concerns? Finally, we consider what general
policy prescriptions can be offered regarding the effective target-
ing of resources to clean up hazardous waste sites.
B. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Superfund Remediations in the Current
Poliy Scenario
Our analysis, outlined below, demonstrates that there are few
Superfund remediations for which the benefits of cleanup exceed
the remediation costs. From a sample of 150 sites where remedia-
tion decisions were made in 1991-92, 51 we collected extensive data
on individual risk levels, cleanup costs, and remediation cleanup
targets. We then used the individual chemical concentration data
collected by EPA to estimate the expected number of cancer cases
arising at a site over the course of thirty years,52 and generated
estimates of noncancer effects by calculating the number of indi-
viduals exposed to levels above the NOAEL or LOAEL (e.g., sites
for which the chemical exposure exceeds the exposure threshold
above which noncancer risks becomes a concern).
We employed two reference points to judge the cost-effective-
ness of Superfund cleanups: $5 million and $100 million in
cleanup costs per cancer case averted. The $5 million figure repre-
sents the midpoint of the range of estimates for the implicit value
of a statistical life using evidence from the labor market wage-risk
tradeoffs.53 The second reference point, $100 million, is a useful
threshold because the Office of Management and Budget has
51. We used a sample of nonfederal sites representative of the NPL as a whole in
terms of previous site use, risk indicators, and regional distribution.
52. 'Ne used a thirty-year period because it is the time horizon used by EPA in its risk
assessments.
Our estimates of cancer cases averted by remediation were derived by combining site
level data on chemical concentration with information on contaminant plume size, data on
groundwater use, and site population figures. For a description of our methodology, see
Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 41.
53. For instance, a worker who receives $500 extra compensation to face an annual
fatality risk of 10" would have an implicit value per statistical life of $5 million, i.e., $500
divided by the 1/10,000 probability to yield a value per unit risk of $5 million. This ap-
proach is recommended for conducting benefit-cost analysis by the U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB). See OMB, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT (Apr. 1, 1992-Mar. 31, 1993) (App. V). For a review of this approach, see W.
KIP ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
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never rejected a proposed regulation with a cost per life saved be-
low $100 million.54 The $100 million figure is also beyond the
value at which there will be mortality costs associated with the regu-
lation (due to diversion of resources from other health-enhancing
uses) that exceed the direct risk reduction effects. 55
The individual lifetime excess cancer risks estimated by EPA at
the 150 sites we examined are extremely high relative to risks regu-
lated in other programs, though if one changes the assumptions
about future land use, the risk estimates drop dramatically. By
EPA's current calculations, among a set of 145 sites, 126 had indi-
vidual lifetime excess cancer risks that were greater than or equal
to 1 0 - . If we match the chemical concentrations at these sites with
information on populations that would be exposed under current
land uses, the cancer risks from Superfund sites appear much dif-
ferent. At the 150 sites examined, over a thirty-year period, there
would be 731 excess cancer cases estimated to arise from contami-
nation. Of this amount, 652 are concentrated at one site, the West-
inghouse site in Sunnyvale, California (notable for a high
concentration of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)). The median
number of cancer cases per site averted by remediation is 0.017.
Only ten of the 150 sites had one or more expected cancer cases
estimated to arise over thirty years.
Our data also demonstrate that the cost-effectiveness of
remediating the 150 sites sampled is quite low. If one matches can-
cers with remediation expenditures, the median cost per cancer
case averted is $384 million. Overall, only 44 out of the 145 sites
had a cost per cancer case averted less than $100 million. These
costs are particularly dramatic considering that these numbers
were calculated using the relatively conservative exposure parame-
ters chosen by EPA, and also do not account for the time lag before
the cancer cases occur. If one assumes mean chemical concentra-
tions and a ten-year latency period for the onset of cancers, and
discounts costs as well as benefits at a rate of 3%, the 150 sites'
median cost per cancer case averted is $6.4 billion. Viewed from
the perspective of cost per cancer case averted in particular, there
54. See Viscusi, supra note 53.
55. See W. Rip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Citeria,
25 RAND J. ECON. 94, 107 (1994); see also Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-
Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulations, 8J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
34, 49-50 (1994); Cass Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CM. L. REv. 1533, 1544-46
(1996); W. ip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 12 (1994).
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is substantial opportunity for regulatory reform to improve the im-
plementation of the Superfund program.
C. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Supefund Remediations Post
Regulatory Reform
We evaluate the consequences of various regulatory reforms
(represented by the "no ARARs" scenario and the "no future on-
site residents" scenario, outlined above) along the following
dimensions: (1) the number of sites qualifying for remediation;
(2) total remediation expenditures; (3) expected cancers averted
by remediation; (4) populations protected from noncancer effects;
and (5) environmental equity. Our results, which demonstrate
that the adoption of the proposed regulatory reforms would save a
great deal of money while sacrificing little in the way of mitigated
health risks, are detailed in Tables 1-5 and explained below.
1. Number of sites that would qualify for remediation.
Table 1 details the number of sites that would qualify for
remediation under the three different scenarios. The table dem-
onstrates that altering risk assessment and benefit-cost practices
would radically change the number of sites subject to remediation.
First, as outlined above, the table demonstrates that the cost-
effectiveness of the remediation decisions chosen under EPA's cur-
rent regulatory regime (i.e., the cost per cancer case averted for
the alternative selected at the site) is quite low, particularly for sites
with total cleanup costs exceeding $5 million. Of the 150 sites in
the sample, 145 had expected cancer cases over a thirty-year period
greater than zero. We restrict our analysis to this group and as-
sume that no policy action is warranted at the five sites with zero
cancer risks. Of these 145 sites, 100 sites, or 69%, had total ex-
pected cleanup costs exceeding $5 million and thus would be sub-
ject to benefit-cost analysis under the proposed regulatory reforms.
Most of the remediations at the sites in this subset would not pass a
benefit-cost test, so different remediation strategies would have to
be considered if regulatory reforms were adopted. Only 5% of
these 100 sites have a cost per cancer case averted under $5 mil-
lion. Twenty-six percent of the 100 sites have a cost per cancer case
averted less than $100 million.5 6
56. Note that these estimates utilize EPA assumptions of conservative risk levels and
do not discount deferred cases of cancer. Thus, even under procedures that overstate
actual cost-effectiveness, few cleanups pass a benefit-cost test.
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The results are somewhat better for the forty-five sites (see Ta-
ble 1: Panel B) where total costs are sufficiently low that benefit-
cost analysis would not be required by the proposed regulatory re-
forms. For this group, 40% (eighteen sites) had cleanups chosen
with costs less than $100 million per cancer case averted, and 18%
(eight sites) had cleanups that cost less than $5 million per cancer
case averted. These numbers suggest that the sites that are ex-
empted from benefit-cost analysis because of their lower cleanup
costs have a greater likelihood of passing a benefit-cost test.
Current Superfund law requires the agency to use state or fed-
eral ARARs as cleanup goals. These cleanup standards, however,
could be overridden by evidence derived from benefit-cost analysis
if regulatory reform legislation trumped existing statutes. If cur-
rent ARARs were ignored, and action were taken only at sites
where cancer risks were at least 1 0 ', the number of sites qualifying
for remediation would drop from 145 to 126. Of the 126 sites that
would be addressed if ARARs could be disregarded, ninety-one
sites had costs sufficient to warrant conducting a benefit-cost analy-
sis under the proposed reforms. Only twenty-four of these sites
had cleanup remedies chosen that would pass a benefit-cost test
based on the $100 million cost per cancer case averted threshold.
Existing Superfund risk assessment guidelines encourage ana-
lysts to consider exposure pathways for on-site residents at
Superfund sites, even if the area today is uninhabited or used as an
industrial site. Table 1 indicates that if EPA analysts considered
only actual risks based on current land use patterns,57 rather than
risks based on future, hypothetical on-site residents (as the case
would be under the "no future on-site residents" scenario), a
remediation policy of cleaning up only those sites with risks of at
least 10 ' would yield a total of 86 sites subject to remediation out
of 145. Of the sixty-eight sites where the costs would warrant bene-
fit-cost analysis, just over a quarter have a cleanup cost under $100
million per cancer case averted; only 6% would have a cleanup cost
under $5 million per case of cancer averted.
57. A more sophisticated application of risk assessment would estimate the
probability that residents would move on site in the future, based on surrounding land
uses and trends in residential growth in the area. This probability would then be multi-
plied by the future on-site resident risk to yield an expected risk for this population. The
role of policy decisions such as zoning restrictions in influencing this probability would
merit consideration as well.
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2. Total expenditures for remediation of Superfund sites.
Implementing regulatory reforms requiring benefit-cost analy-
sis would decrease the number of sites that would be remediated,
substantially decreasing the total expenditures for the Superfund
program. Table 2 examines the cost levels for the different policy
scenarios considered in Table 1. A total of $2.2 billion will be
spent in cleanup costs at the 145 sites under current policy. If the
remedies selected remain unchanged, but the number of sites
remediated declined because decisions regarding which sites to
clean up were made only on the basis of cancer risks rather than
ARARs, as would be the case under the "no ARARs" scenario, $2.0
billion would be spent on cleanup. Cleanup costs drop to $1.6 bil-
lion if potential risks from future on-site residents do not trigger
cleanups.
As one would expect, the total remediation costs are much
greater at sites above the $5 million total cleanup cost trigger: $2.1
billion versus $82.2 million, despite the fact that one-third of the
sites falls below the $5 million threshold. By focusing on the two-
thirds of the sites with expenditures large enough to warrant a ben-
efit-cost analysis, the EPA would examine 96% of expenditures.
Within each scenario, a small percentage of the total expenditures
is spent at sites where the currently selected remedy yields a cost
per cancer case averted case that passes a benefit-cost test. For the
larger sites with costs above $5 million, a total of $72 million is
spent at sites with a cleanup cost per cancer case averted below $5
million, and $593 million is spent at sites with a cleanup cost per
cancer case averted below $100 million. More than $1.4 billion in
costs at these larger sites is spent to reduce cancers at a cleanup
cost above $100 million per cancer case averted. For the smaller
sites with total cleanup costs less than $5 million, $3.5 million is
spent at sites where a remediation cost per case of cancer averted is
below $5 million, and $25 million is spent to reduce cancer cases at
a cleanup cost below $100 million per cancer case averted. The
remaining $57 million is spent on cancer prevention at a rate
above $100 million per cancer case averted.
More widespread use of benefit-cost analysis in determining
which sites to remediate thus offers the potential for large savings
in the Superfund program. If EPA remediation decisions were
made based on actual risks (rather than ARARs), the number of
sites remediated drops from 145 to 126 and expenditures drop by
$150 million. Ruling out hypothetical risks to future on-site resi-
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dents reduces the number of sites to eighty-six, cutting cleanup
costs by an additional $420 million. If one recalculates the cleanup
costs of those sites which do not pass the benefit-cost test, and as-
sumes alternative remedies instead of the remedy actually imple-
mented, costs would drop even further.
3. Expected health problems averted by remediation.
Under the reform scenarios, while both the number of sites
that would qualify for remediation and the total amount of
Superfund cleanup expenditures would dramatically decrease, the
vast majority of cancer cases would still be averted since the sites
that would qualify for remediation are the sites that pose greater
cancer risks (see Table 3). Remediation of the full sample of 145
sites would avoid 731 estimated cancers arising over thirty years
from site contamination. Basing decisions to remediate on risk
levels of 10' or higher reduces the number of sites remediated to
126, but would still avert 713 cancers. Ruling out remediations
based on risks to future on-site residents reduces the number of
sites remediated to eighty-six, but does not significantly impact the
number of cancer cases averted, which would shrink only to 710.
Even when remediation decisions are generally based on current
land uses rather than hypothetical future residential use, the clean-
ups avert the vast majority of cancers arising from the full sample
of sites.
All but two of the total cancer cases averted are at sites with
costs that would warrant a benefit-cost test. Perhaps most striking
is that the requirement of benefit-cost tests for sites with total
cleanup costs over $5 million captures most of the cases of cancer
that could be prevented. If EPA remediated only those sites sub-
ject to benefit-cost analysis which can be cleaned up for less than
$5 million per cancer case averted, 704 of the expected 731 cancer
cases would be averted. With a $100 million cost per cancer case
cutoff, 726 out of the 731 expected cases would be prevented.
Implementation of a benefit-cost test would yield similar results
for exposure to noncancer health risks, even though the test fo-
cuses on cancer effects. As Table 4 illustrates, regulatory reform
would reduce expenditures while still protecting a significant
number of residents from exposure to noncancer risks. For the
sample of 145 sites, 113,000 residents living within one mile of a
contaminated site face exposure to at least one chemical with a
chemical exposure level above the no risk threshold. For the "no
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ARARs" scenario, the number of those protected drops by only
3,000 people to 110,000. Remediation of sites under the "no fu-
ture on-site resident scenario" would continue to protect 97,000
people (86% of the original number protected by remediation of
145 sites). Restricting site cleanups to those that passed a benefit-
cost test would address most of these noncancer exposures. For
example, remediating only those sites that can be cleaned up for
less than $5 million per cancer case averted would protect 70,500
(68,000 plus 2,500) people from noncancer risks; remediating only
those sites that can be cleaned up for less than $100 million per
cancer case averted protects over 100,000 (97,000 plus 3,400) of
the 113,000 people exposed to such health risks.
Because cancer and noncancer health risks exhibit a strong cor-
relation, the vast majority of noncancer exposures can be averted
by remediating sites that pass a benefit-cost analysis whereby the
cost per cancer case averted is less than $100 million. However, in
a full benefit-cost analysis, EPA decisionmakers would collect more
information on the magnitudes and harms of noncancer effects.
This might lead to even more noncancer effects being addressed at
the sample sites.
4. Natural resource considerations.
Proposed Superfund policies such as cleaning up sites on the
basis of risk levels rather than ARARs, excluding hypothetical fu-
ture risks, and applying benefit-cost tests to determine what sites to
remediate all decrease remediation costs while preserving high
levels of protection from cancer and noncancer risks. Two addi-
tional criteria are relevant in evaluating policy choices: the preven-
tion of natural resource damage and the exposure of different
demographic groups to different levels of health risks (i.e., envi-
ronmental equity). According to EPA survey data, environmental
concerns served as the basis for cleanup goals at only twenty-one of
the 145 sample sites.5" If potential on-site future residents did not
drive remediation decisions, only eight of the twenty-one sites
would still be protected. Of the twenty-one sites with assessed risks
relating to natural resource damage, only four were cleaned up at a
cost per cancer case averted of less than $100 million. These num-
bers suggest that since natural resource damages may not be
strongly correlated to cancer risks, adequate protection against nat-
58. Search of Remedial Project Managers Site Database, Office of Emergency and
Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. (1993).
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ural resource damage would require that risk analysts explicitly in-
corporate measures of natural resource damages into remediation
decisions.59
5. Environmental equity concerns.
Risk assessment is frequently criticized for generating policies
that have a negative impact on minority communities.6" Such criti-
cisms may be especially relevant to the Superfund effort since cur-
rent Superfund guidelines do not incorporate synergistic effects of
exposures to multiple chemicals (due to a lack of toxicity data).t
Risks to minorities, who are more likely to experience multiple ex-
posures, may therefore be undercounted. 62 And while some com-
munities may benefit from hiring technical expertise to critique
EPA's analysis, minority communities are typically less able to af-
ford such consultation. Although Superfund has a technical assist-
ance program that funds analysis for local communities, our
research indicates that minority communities are much less likely
to receive these grants than other communities.6"
The proposed risk reform legislation however, will not dispro-
portionately harm minority populations. For the purpose of this
assessment we define the minority population around a site as the
total population minus non-Hispanic whites. Minorities would
thus include African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Native Ameri-
cans, and those defined as other races in the census. Table 5
59. For a discussion of natural resource damages and Superfund, see Richard B. Stew-
art, Liability for Natural Resource Injuiy: Beyond Tort, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS,
SCIENCE, AND LAW 219 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
60. Kuehn, supra note 20 at 106-07.
61. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Estimating Environmental Equity: Who
Bears Risks at Superfund Sites? (1996) (working paper, on file with the Stanford Envzron-
mental Law Journal) (indicating that for residents living within one mile of Superfund sites,
the mean number of polluting facilities/sites tracked in five different EPA pollution
databases within one mile of these Superfund sites was 11.4 for minority residents versus
6.3 for white residents. Minorities are thus more likely to bear a burden from synergistic
effects from these multiple sources of pollution). For an additional discussion of environ-
mental equity and Superfund, see JOHN A. HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (1994) (finding that the number of sites in a county on the NPL
increased with the nonwhite population percentage); Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and
Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649 (1993) (finding that the percentage of blacks and
Hispanics of the aggregate populations of communities with NPL sites were higher than
their national population percentage). See also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in
Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics ?, 103 YALE Lj. 1383 (1994);
RichardJ Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REa. 787 (1993).
62. See Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 61.
63. Id. at 25-26.
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reveals that for each policy scenario the minority population per-
centage is very similar. At the 146 sites that would be remediated
under the current policy scenario, the mean minority population
percentage is 17%.64 The mean minority population is also 17% at
the 126 sites remediated under the "no ARARs" scenario, and 16%
for the policy scenario assuming "no future on-site residents." The
mean minority population percentage at sites subject to a benefit-
cost test is also virtually identical to the overall minority percent-
ages at these sites.
A different pattern emerges with respect to the mean minority
percentage at sites that pass a benefit-cost test. At those sites with
cleanup costs greater than $5 million, which pass a benefit-cost test
assuming a saved life is worth $5 million, the mean minority per-
centage ranges from 32% to 39%. For smaller scale sites that are
not subject to a benefit-cost analysis, but that would pass a benefit-
cost test assuming a saved life is worth $5 million, the mean minor-
ity population ranges from 17% to 34%. The departure from the
overall mean minority population percentages is less dramatic for
the larger set of sites which pass a benefit-cost test assuming a saved
life is worth $100 million. Nevertheless, even for this high cutoff,
minorities are not disadvantaged by a regulatory scenario that re-
quires benefit-cost analysis to determine which sites are
remediated: the sites that pass the benefit-cost test, and therefore
are remediated, have a higher mean minority population percent-
age than those sites with cleanups that do not pass a benefit-cost
test.
Implementation of risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis re-
quirements would also benefit minority populations by overriding
some of the discretionary elements of the Superfund program
which allow constituent pressures to trigger policy actions. Such
discretionary elements can leave minority communities at a disad-
vantage if such communities are less likely to engage in collective
action to pressure regulators or if their actions are met with less
response.65 We have found evidence that this is the case. The pro-
cess by which sites are placed on the National Priorities List, the set
of sites that qualify for remediation funds, is influenced by commu-
64. The mean minority population is the average of the population percentages in
the given subsample of sites.
65. James T. Hamilton, A Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political
Power?, 14J. POL'vANALsIsis & MGawr. 107, 129 (1995) (demonstrating that firms calculating
where to expand hazardous waste processing capacity are more likely to target areas with
lower levels of potential political activity).
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nity pressure. Controlling for a measure of local levels of pollu-
tion, we found that hazardous sites in communities with higher
percentages of minorities were less likely to be placed on the NPL;
and that Superfund site residents in high minority, lower voter
turnout sites are less likely to receive the technical assistance grants
administered by the agency.66
Table 5 indicates that if the regulatory playing field were lev-
eled so that site remediation decision were based only on risks and
costs rather than on community pressure or other factors, minority
populations would not be harmed. The mean minority population
percentage is actually much higher at the sites where remediations
would be implemented based on benefit-cost analysis alone. Those
smaller scale sites not subject to a benefit-cost test have slightly
lower minority population percentages. In sum, risk assessment
and benefit-cost analysis may help reduce environmental inequities
by reducing the role for constituent pressure in remediations and
by focusing attention on high health risks, which often occur in
minority communities.
6. Accounting for changes in risk assumptions.
The first five subsections of Part IVC. generally treated the way
that risks are calculated-hazard identification, exposure assess-
ment and dose response-as a given and examined how changes in
risk characterization and risk management rules altered site rem-
edy decisions. This subsection quantifies how additional changes
in EPA's risk assessment calculations would alter Superfund deci-
sion making.
As noted in Part III, if Congress adopted the risk reform provi-
sions, EPA's calculation of risks would change in at least three ways.
First, the reforms could require EPA to use population risks, rather
than individual risks, as the basis of its risk assessments. Second,
the requirement that agencies report risk estimates based on cen-
tral tendencies would shift EPA's risk assessment analyses away
from the use of "reasonable maximum exposure" scenarios to
those based on mean assumptions. Third, the reforms would re-
quire EPA to assess risk not as a single point estimate, but as a
probability distribution.
Our data demonstrate that the use of central tendency esti-
mates in risk assessment greatly alters the ascertained magnitude of
66. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 61.
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individual risks and population risks.6 7 For 141 sites, we recalcu-
lated EPA estimates of soil and groundwater ingestion risks (which
account for 40% of the exposure pathways at these Superfund
sites). If one examines the maximum ingestion pathways at the
sixty-seven sites where estimates of average chemical concentrates
were available, the magnitude of the individual risks calculated are
quite large (mean 0.038, median 0.0019). Classifying these sites on
the basis of maximum ingestion risks, 94% would fall in EPA's cur-
rent range requiring remediation (risk at least 10-), 5% would be
in the discretionary range (10' to 10-), and 1% in the range
where remediation is generally not pursued under current guide-
lines.68 But if one uses mean estimates for the ingestion rates, ex-
posure duration, and contaminant concentration parameters, the
magnitude of the maximum ingestion risks drops substantially.
The mean of the maximum ingestion risks using current EPA
guidelines is twenty times larger than that derived from central ten-
dency estimates (0.0019). The median risk calculated under EPA
guidelines is also greater than that estimated with central tendency
assumptions (0.00011). If EPA cleaned up sites based on maxi-
mum ingestion-risk levels calculated under central tendencies,
54% would fall into the remediation category of risks in excess of
10', 43% would be in the discretionary zone of risks between 10 -
and 10-6, and 3% would be in the category of risks below 10-6
where remediations are not generally pursued. A shift to central
tendencies would thus place a substantial percentage of sites in the
discretionary zone.
The number of cancer cases expected to arise also changes dra-
matically if one uses assumptions less conservative than those used
by EPA. If exposure and intake parameters are set at conservative
values, there are 731 cancer cases estimated to arise at the 145 sites
over the next thirty years.69 Under a different set of assumptions
that the intake rate/body weight ratio and chemical contaminant
values are at their means, that cancer occurs with a ten-year la-
tency, and that cancer cases are discounted at 3% per year (since
individuals value cancer cases differeritly depending on whether
67. See generally Viscusi et al., supra note 38 (discussing the use of central tendency
estimates).
68. This sample of 67 sites excluded nine sites where the EPA chose to take "no ac-
tion." If those "no action" sites were included, the mean risk for the 76 sites would be .034
and the median risk would be .0015.
69. See generally Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 41 (describing the estimation
methodology).
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they are averted now or in the future), the estimated number of
cancer cases changes from 699 to 204 cases at the ninety-nine sites
where average concentrations were available.
Our data also demonstrate that the combination of conservative
assumptions results in highly conservative estimates of the risks
arising at Superfund sites. Monte Carlo analysis offers another way
to quantify the degree of conservatism embedded in EPA's RME
scenario. To explore this, we calculated a distribution of ingestion
risks arising at eighty-six different sites using information on the
distributions of exposure parameters and chemical concentrations.
For the maximum ingestion pathways calculated under EPA guide-
lines, nearly two-thirds of the sites fell in the 99th percentile of the
distributions calculated under Monte Carlo analysis.7"
7. A note on remedy selections.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act directs
EPA to select remedies that "permanently and significantly reduce
the volume, toxicity, or mobility of hazardous substances. ' 7 1 This
requirement constrains the agency to favor permanent treatment
of 'contaminants at a site over potentially less costily remedies, such
as institutional controls, containment, or removal of waste. Never-
theless, the diversity of remedies that have been selected, detailed
in Table 6, demonstrates that site managers do enjoy some discre-
tion over the selection of remedies.
Table 6 explores how remedy selection varies across different
categories of sites. Specifically, institutional controls and removals
were more likely at sites where cleanup costs were below $5 million
than at those where cleanup expenditures exceeded $5 million. 72
In terms of cost-effectiveness, sites that were cleaned up at less than
$100 million per cancer case avoided were much more likely to
deal with soil contamination through institutional controls or re-
movals than through treatment. The same holds true for ground-
70. Risk reform's emphasis on central tendencies and sensitivity analysis would help
make clear the costs of conservatism. These costs are expressed in terms of both financial
losses as well as expected lives lost. Resources may be diverted from cleaning up those sites
with large expected risks, to those for which the risk is expected to be small but the con-
servative approach suggests that there is some chance that the risk could be large.
71. SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1994).
72. This pattern is especially pronounced for groundwater contaminants. At roughly
half of the sites involving groundwater contamination where cleanup costs were less than
$5 million, EPA addressed contamination through institutional controls. Of the more ex-
pensive sites with groundwater contamination, EPA selected treatment remedies for 75%
of the sites.
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water remedies: sites which passed the rough benefit-cost test
(with the assumption that a life is worth $100 million) were more
likely to deal with groundwater contamination through institu-
tional controls. At some sites multiple remedies that use similar
technologies but vary in price were proposed to deal with contami-
nation. At sites with expenditures less than $5 million, the less ex-
pensive soil proposal was chosen 52% of the time, while at more
expensive sites the cheaper soil alternative was chosen only 33% on
the time. There is thus some room for additional discretion to be
used to reduce costs under current guidelines, despite the statuto-
rily mandated preference for permanence which restricts the types
of alternatives considered and chosen at sites.
Of the 145 sites in our sample, only forty-four had a cost per
cancer case avoided which was less than $100 million under cur-
rent remedy selections. Of those 101 sites which did not meet this
cutoff, fourteen had considered but not chosen remedies that, if
chosen, would have resulted in a cost per cancer averted of less
than $100 million. At the remainder of the sites, none of the reme-
dies proposed by EPA would result in a cost per cancer averted of
less than $100 million. To achieve greater efficiencies in cleanup
at Superfund sites, regulatory reform would have to allow equal
consideration of all possible remedies rather than strongly favoring
permanent treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The current policy approach used in the Superfund program is
a peculiar halfway house. EPA devotes substantial effort to identify-
ing chemicals at a site and ascertaining their potential risks. It also
assesses the costs of a range of remedies in considerable detail.
However, many key elements are missing in the agency's analyses.
There is no explicit consideration of the size of the population at
risk. Risks to a single individual have the same weight as risks to a
large exposed population. Actual and hypothetical exposures to
chemicals receive equal weight so that risks to a person who, in the
future, may choose to live near a currently uninhabited Superfund
site receive the same weight as risks to large populations that are
currently involuntarily exposed.73 EPA also reports the conserva-
tive risk assessment value for each site, without focusing its policy
73. We found that in setting cleanup target risk levels for chemicals at Superfund
sites there is not a statistically significant difference in the treatment of current exposure
pathways versus future, hypothetical exposure pathways. NV. Kip Viscusi &James T. Hamil-
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attention on the expected risk level or most likely risk scenarios.
Finally, explicit tradeoffs that balance benefits and costs do not
enter remediation decisions. These problems arise in part because
of decision-making constraints in the Superfund legislation and in
part because of the manner in which regulators have implemented
the program.
Our data show that the core economic elements of the pro-
posed regulatory reform bills would dramatically alter EPA's policy
choices. Put simply, the reforms would require that agency regula-
tions maximize the net gain to society (benefits less costs) using
plausible risk assumptions. Sound risk assessment and benefit-cost
analysis would force wiser spending and eliminate many of the
problems that decrease the overall performance of those poten-
tially desirable regulatory efforts such as hazardous waste cleanup.
Consider how benefit-cost analysis would help answer how ef-
fectively EPA has targeted its expenditures to reduce risks: for the
most effective 5% of cleanup expenditures, through remediation
EPA eliminates 99.46% of the cancer risks averted. All expendi-
tures beyond that level will have cleanup costs per discounted case
of cancer averted in excess of $140 million. Potentially, EPA can
generate virtually all the gains in reduced risk at a fraction of the
cleanup costs. At present, 95% of the expenditures at Superfund sites are
devoted to eliminating only 0.5 % of the cancer risk.7 4
Under risk assessment and risk management reforms, EPA
would assess population risks, rather than simply individual risks,
from contamination at Superfund sites. The agency would present
central tendency estimates so that analysts could see the range of
risks at a site.75 More flexible remedy decisions based on risk levels
rather than ARARs would reduce the costs associated with cleanup
goals based on standards from other environmental programs, and
costs based on the preference for permanent remedies.
Risk reform is inevitably vulnerable to becoming a vehicle for
ignoring environmental hazards rather than remediating them
more efficiently. As our analysis shows however, there is a wide
zone within which risk reforms can improve efficiency without sac-
rificing human health considerations. In our analysis, the shift to-
ton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions
(1996) (working paper, on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Journal).
74. These calculations assume a 3% discount rate for costs and cancers, a ten year
latency period for the onset of cancers, and average exposure concentrations and intake
parameters.
75. This is a process which Monte Carlo analysis would also further.
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ward site cleanups based on risk levels alone-rather than ARARs
and calculations that include on-site future residents-would re-
duce the number of sites remediated from 145 to eighty-six and
site expenditures from $2.2 billion to $1.6 billion, but would re-
duce the number of cancer cases averted by only twenty-one (from
731 to 710) and the number of individuals protected from non-
cancer exposures by 16,000 (from 113,000 to 97,000). Our analysis
further indicates that calculation of risks based on central tendency
should shift a substantial fraction of sites into the cleanup discre-
tionary zone, where EPA site managers currently have the authority
to decide whether or not to remediate a site. Removal of prefer-
ence for permanence would also allow managers to consider more
cost-effective alternatives.
The findings for minority populations are perhaps the most
telling. Sites that pass a benefit-cost test have a much higher mean
minority percentage than the average for the overall set of sites
considered. These results help provide an efficiency rationale for
the environmental equity movement. If current political pressures
lead to neglect of environmental harms in minority communities,
as the environmental justice critics note, such communities could
benefit from decisions made on the merits of the risks. Our data
support this: sites with large minority populations had stronger
benefit-cost performance. By focusing on objective measures of
risk, benefit-cost analysis will highlight the policy importance of ad-
dressing the real risks that minorities may face from hazardous
waste sites.
To be more effective, current risk assessments must include
more information-such as calculation of population risk-than
they do now. EPA must better document any potentially important
natural resource damage, noncancer effects, and synergistic influ-
ences. The transaction costs of these new calculations Would be
vastly offset by the savings afforded by an efficient implementation
of the program. Our analysis shows that there is ample room for
reforms to cut expenditures on cleanup with minimal sacrifice in
terms of health risks.
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